In an effort to protect its computer systems from malevolent actors, the U.S. government has developed a series of intrusion-detection and intrusionprevention systems aimed at monitoring and screening traffic between the internet and government systems. With EINSTEIN 3, the government now may seek to do the same for private critical infrastructure networks.
privacy considerations affect possible solutions, this Article provides suggestions for more effective ways to protect certain critical infrastructure.
I. Introduction
Effectiveness should be the measure of any deployed technology. Does the solution actually solve the problem? Does it do so in a cost-efficient manner? If the solution creates new difficulties, are these easier to handle than the original problem? In short, is the solution effective? In the rush to protect the United States after the 9/11 attacks, effectiveness was not always the primary driver in determining the value of the proposed systems. In this context we consider the potential extension to the private sector of EINSTEIN 3, a federal program to detect and prevent cyber intrusions. Providing services to the public is a fundamental role for U.S. federal civilian agencies, and beginning in the mid 1990s, many agencies turned to the Internet. This shift was not without problems. While confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity dominated early federal thinking about computer and Internet security, agencies faced multifarious threats, including phishing, IP spoofing, botnets, denials-of-service (DoS), distributed denialsof-service (DDoS), and man-in-the-middle attacks. 2 Some exploits were done purely for the publicity, but others had serious purpose behind them. By the early 2000s, the growing number of attacks on U.S. civilian agency systems could not be ignored, and in 2004 the United States began an active effort to protect federal civilian agencies from cyber intrusions. 3 This classified program, EINSTEIN, sought to perform real-time, or near real-2 Phishing is an attempt to direct a user to a fraudulent website (often a bank) to collect login and password information. IP spoofing puts a false address on an email in order to deceive the receiver. A botnet is a collection of hacked machines-a "bot" (short for robot)-controlled by a third party. A denial ofsenice is a deliberate attempt to overload some service so legitimate users cannot access the service. For example, if a web site is connected to the Internet via a 10 Mbps line, the attacker might send 100 Mbps of traffic towards it, leaving no bandwidth for legitimate traffic. It may be the case that the attacker does not have a machine that can generate 100 Mbps of traffic, but can control-perhaps through a botnet-one hundred machines, each of which can send 1 Mbps of traffic to the machine being attacked. This would constitute a distulbuted denial ofsenice attack. A man-in-the-middle attack is an unauthorized intermediary in a communication; this intermediary may modify messages as they transit from sender to recipient or may just eavesdrop.
time, automatic collection, correlation, and analysis of computer intrusion information as a first step in protecting federal civilian agency computer systems.
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EINSTEIN has grown into a series of programs-EINSTEIN, EINSTEIN 2, and EINSTEIN 3-all based on intrusion-detection systems (IDS) and intrusion-prevention systems (IPS). These are based on signatures, a set of values or characteristics describing particular attacks.? A network IDS monitors network traffic and reports suspected malicious activity, while a network IPS goes one step further by attempting to automatically stop the malicious activity (e.g., by dropping the offending traffic or automatically "fighting back" against the suspected adversary).
In the original effort, EINSTEIN intrusion-detection systems were to be located at federal agency Internet access points, the intent being to gather information to protect U.S. federal government networks. If traffic appeared "anomalous," session information would be sent to US-CERT, the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team, a federal government clearing house for cyber intrusion information. 6 Hard as it may be to believe, prior to EINSTEIN, information sharing between federal civilian agencies on cyberattacks was done purely on an ad hoc basis. 7 The original EINSTEIN effort was not very successful. EINSTEIN information sharing did not happen in real time, and the voluntary nature of the program meant that many agencies did not participate. The next version, Because real-time information sharing is fundamental to the EINSTEIN model, centralizing the intrusion detection and intrusion protection functionality is part of the EINSTEIN architecture. But while using IDS and, to a lesser extent, IPS to protect networks is not new, centralizing IDS and IPS functionality in such large networks as that of the federal civilian sector presents complex challenges. This is one reason that the EINSTEIN program deserves public scrutiny. Another is the turn the program appeared to take in September 2007 when the Baltimore Sun reported the National Security Agency (NSA) was developing classified plans for protecting private communication networks from intrusion. 8 This news was more than a bit contradictory a classified U.S. federal government program for protecting widely used private-sector systems but little information was available about this "Cyber Initiative." 9 The result was that public comment was limited. In January 2008 the Cyber Initiative became marginally better known. The Bush Administration issued National Security Presidential Directive 54 establishing the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI), a largely classified program for protecting federal civilian agencies against cyber intrusions. EINSTEIN was one aspect of CNCI that was made public, though large portions of the program remained classified. Public understanding of EINSTEIN's intent, how it worked, what risks it raised, and what it protected continued to be limited.
In July 2010, the Wall Street Journal reported Raytheon had an NSA contract to study the value of sensors in recognizing impending cyberattacks in critical infrastructure cyber networks; Raytheon's contract was for the initial phase of the program, known as "Perfect Citizen."' 0 Public reaction was swift and highly critical.' NSA responded with a statement that, Siobhan Gorman, NSA to Defend Against Hackeis: Pivacy Fears Raised as Spy Ageng Timns to System Protection, BALT. SUN (Sept. 20., 2007) , http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2007-09-20 /news/ 0709200117 1 homeland-national-security-agency-intelligence-agencies. 1A.
Id. "PERFECT CITIZEN is purely a vulnerabilities-assessment and capabilities-development contract. This is a research and engineering effort. There is no monitoring activity involved, and no sensors are employed in this endeavor."' 2 While the project may initially have been solely a research effort, the idea of extending EINSTEIN-type protections to the private sector is increasingly being proposed by DC policy makers.' 3 Indeed, in
June 2011, the Washington Post reported that three Internet carriers, AT&T, Verizon, and CenturyLink, had deployed tools developed by the NSA for filtering the traffic of fifteen defense contractors.1 4 According to the Post, officials said, "the government will not directly filter the traffic or receive the malicious code captured by the Internet providers."'1
Extending an EINSTEIN-like program to the private sector raises numerous issues. The first is scale, the second, a mismatch between the program and critical infrastructure that makes it difficult to apply the technology to critical infrastructure, the third, the legal and regulatory issues that govern critical infrastructure.
Scale matters. While federal civilian systems directly serve two million employees, critical infrastructure systems in the United States serve a population of over three hundred million Americans daily. Can a program that effectively protects the communications of federal agencies with one hundred thousand employees really do the same for the communications giants that instead serve a hundred million people? The smart grid, with hundreds of communications a day to hundreds of millions of endpoints, far exceeds the traffic EINSTEIN is designed to handle.
Nor will size be the only problem in transitioning EINSTEIN systems from federal civilian agencies to the civilian sector. While the U.S. government can mandate the specific technologies used by federal agencies, Finally, expanding EINSTEIN-type technology to critical infrastructure is complicated by the complex legal and regulatory landscape of such systems. Putting it simply, there are fundamental differences between communication networks supporting the U.S. federal government and those supporting the private sector critical infrastructures. These differences create serious difficulties in attempting to extend EINSTEINtype technologies beyond the federal sector. Such issues appear to be ignored by policy pundits in a headlong rush to protect critical infrastructure.
While few doubt the value of IDS and IPS as part of a cyber security solution, can EINSTEIN really work? What attacks does EINSTEIN prevent? What will it miss? How good is EINSTEIN as a security solution? Is privacy properly protected? This paper is an attempt to provide answers to these questions, answers that are urgently needed in view of efforts to expand EINSTEIN beyond its original mandate.
We begin by presenting the EINSTEIN architecture in Section II. In Section III, we discuss the technical and policy concerns raised by the use of EINSTEIN 3 by federal civilian agencies. We observe that the current EINSTEIN deployment across the federal sector raises privacy and security concerns and propose changes in policy to alleviate these concerns.
In Section IV, we examine two critical infrastructures, the power grid and telecommunications. We observe that while critical infrastructure should, of course, deploy intrusion detection and intrusion prevention systems, the consolidation and real-time information sharing model central to the EINSTEIN 3 cannot effectively migrate to these private sector systems. We propose alternative methods to protect telecommunication and power grid cyber networks. In Section V, we return to EINSTEIN, proposing various technical and policy changes.
II. EINSTEIN 3 Architecture
The CNCI goals were protecting against current cyber security threats and more sophisticated ones anticipated in the future.1 6 CNCI involved a dozen initiatives, the first being to manage the federal enterprise network as a single network. EINSTEIN was part of this, as was Trusted Internet Connections (TIC), a program that, by consolidating federal connections to the public Internet, would help ensure that these connections were professionally protected.' 7
Under the TIC program, federal civilian agencies use TIC Access Providers (TICAPs) to operate the TICs. Large federal agencies utilize a few TICs (generally two to four) while small agencies may share TICs. Some agencies have been certified as capable of acting as their own TICAP but most seek service from an approved TICAP.' 8 The reduction in external access points, from a few thousand to around one hundred, was crucial to the EINSTEIN 2 and EINSTEIN 3 efforts. EINSTEIN 2 uses devices located at TICs to monitor traffic coming into or exiting from government networks. Located at the agency's TICAPs,1 9 the EINSTEIN 2 sensors collect communications session data; this could include packet length, protocol, source and destination IP address and port numbers, and timestamp and duration information of communications to/from federal civilian agencies. 20 The EINSTEIN 2 sensors alert US-CERT whenever traffic signatures, patterns of known malware (e.g., the IP address of a server known to be hosting malware or an attachment known to include a virus), were observed in incoming packets of traffic. 2 ' The fact that EINSTEIN 2 sensors match signatures of incoming traffic means that the sensors are actually examining packet content, a fact that has not been made explicit in the public documentation concerning To strengthen protections, EINSTEIN 2 is configured to perform real-time detection of patterns of anomalous communications behavior. Doing so requires observing large volumes of traffic so that the anomaly detector is able to develop a model of what "normal" traffic looks like. One of the purposes of consolidation was to provide sufficient data within each Internet connection for the EINSTEIN boxes to study. The third effort, EINSTEIN 3, will move from intrusion detection to intrusion prevention. Intrusion prevention systems devices will be located at the agency TICAPs, which will redirect traffic destined to or from the U.S. federal government network through the EINSTEIN 3 device without affecting other traffic (that is, without affecting communications not destined for U.S. federal government networks). 2 4 As of this Article, EINSTEIN 3 is in preliminary stages, having been tested only at a single medium-sized federal civilian agency. 2 5 Initially EINSTEIN 3 will recognize cyber threats by analyzing network traffic to determine if it matches known signatures. 26 Commercial IPSs will develop signatures to be used in their devices, and it is reasonable to expect that the government will create a mechanism to use these signatures. Commercial IPSs respond to threats through two methods: by discarding suspect traffic before it reaches its destination and by sending carefully crafted messages to the perceived source of the threat.
The aim of EINSTEIN 3 is "to automatically detect and respond appropriately to cyber threats before harm is done;" 2 7 EINSTEIN 3 devices will perform deep packet inspection, examining not only transactional By limiting the number of access points, the TICs concentrate the data, enabling a better search for "clues" about anomalous behavior. This improves the likelihood of discovering new threats. The limited number of access points makes it potentially feasible to establish a program of monitoring and intervention for all federal civilian agency access to the public Internet, and also limits the cost of the EINSTEIN effort both in terms of capital cost (e.g., fewer EINSTEIN boxes) and in operational expenditures (fewer people required to manage the system).
Initial concerns about the EINSTEIN effort focused on privacy threats raised by the project. Because EINSTEIN IDSs and IPSs would operate on all traffic destined for federal networks, the system would undoubtedly intercept private communications of federal employees (e.g., if a federal employee used an agency computer to check a private email account during lunch). However, in this respect, a federal employee is no different from employees at regulated industries using company-supplied equipment for personal communications; they, and the people with whom they communicate, are also subject to company monitoring. Thus while there are privacy concerns raised by a wide use of EINSTEIN within the federal government, we believe that these are not insurmountable, and with adequate technical and policy oversight, can be properly handled.
28 Internet communications are broken into short blocks of data called packets that travel the network separately; when these packets reach the recipient, they are reassembled to recreate the longer files from which they came.
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A trap-and-trace device captures the transactional information of an incoming communication; in the case of a phone call, this would be the phone number. A trap-andtrace device does not capture content. * These analogies are not exact. For example, EINSTEIN 2 and EINSTEIN 3 devices scan only a subset of communications. Minimization consists of singling out communications matching previously determined patterns or exhibiting anomalous behavior. More significantly, wiretaps do not prevent the occurrence of communications in which there is evidence of criminal activity, but the EINSTEIN 3 devices will do so. As both EINSTEIN 2 and 3 are used only for communications to/from federal civilian agencies., these interceptions are not considered electronic surveillance from a legal perspective.
III. Technical and Policy Concerns Raised by the EINSTEIN 3 Architecture
To understand EINSTEIN's effectiveness, the architecture and the numbers must be examined. The EINSTEIN documents shared with the public have little detail, so we will start with a thought experiment. Consider the technical complexities of a centralized IDS/IPS system with few pipes serving multiple federal civilian agencies with two million users. The complexities include:
Scale: Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks can be daunting; they have been measured at 100 Gb/s. 3 Consolidation provided by the TICs may assist in recognizing an ongoing DoS attack. But of course each IDS box has limits on the bandwidth it can support. If the TIC bandwidth is sufficiently high, incoming traffic will need to be divided over multiple links, diminishing the savings afforded by consolidation. In addition, consolidation may inadvertently cause collateral damage from an attack (e.g., the Patent and Trademark Office is targeted, but the attack also affects other Department of Commerce sites at the same TIC). 2 By comparing aspects of the received packets to each other, in particular their "address headers," it is usually possible to detect the presence of an attack, its method of operation, its physical source, and, in some cases, the actual attacker. Owing to the large volume of packets that travel through a network, this analysis must be statistical in nature, but examination of each packet is required both to detect known types of attacks and to determine the nuances of new ones.
*
"Diarize" is used within the trade to mean making a diary of the data; in the case of a telephone call, this might be the to/from, time, and length of the call, while for IP communications, this would be the metadata of source and destination IP addresses. TCP source and destination ports., and perhaps length of packet.
sampled to characterize arbitrary new threats. Because all data must be scrutinized, the size of the problem quickly becomes unmanageable.
Think of potential correlation solutions as having two variables: architectures can range from highly "centralized" to fully "decentralized" and sensors can be "smart" or "dumb," that is, having the ability to perform large quantities of computation locally, or not.
If analysis is performed locally at the data collection point, then the need to see all incoming data requires that all raw signals be sent to all sensors. This quickly becomes unmanageable. If there are n sensors, then each sensor must look at the data from (n-1) other sensors, and there are n(n-1)/2 pairs of data traversing the network. This is simply unmanageable when n is at all large (EINSTEIN is designed to have between one and two hundred). Note that this solution also introduces a new problem: protecting the sensors that would carry security-sensitive information.
At the other end of the scale, an alternative approach would be to centralize the data to perform the correlation. Because summarizing the data cannot solve the problem, all the data must travel through the system to the centralized detector. (We note that in an IP-based environment, the packet summary information is 1.5-30% of the data. 34 Summarizing the data does not provide savings in the same 3 Diarizing the data, supra note 33, means using the metadata. In the packetcommunication world, this would involve the following types of data: exact time and date of the packet's arrival down to the submicrosecond: 12 bytes; source and destination IP addresses: 8 bytes; source and destination TCP ports: 8 bytes; underlying protocol (such as http): 2 bytes; packet length: 2 bytes: and optionally layer 2 headers and/or detected content flags: maximum 4 bytes. This is a minimum of 32 bytes per transmitted packet. IP packets are variable in length., running as short as 100 bytes (e.g.., VoIP) and as long as 1500 bytes (e.g., email). Thus metadata for IP/TCP communications constitutes somewhere between 1.5% (32 bytes out of 1500) and 30% (32 bytes out of 100). This constitutes a considerably higher percentage of metadata than is present in the equivalent diary for voice.
scale that it would for telephone communications.) This is enormously costly for a network of any scale. Such a process would be unable to provide the millisecond response needed in a serious attack.
(Of course, one could try a solution that is neither fully decentralized nor fully sharing signals. Depending on where one decides to perform the correlation, the problems above will still occur. The two alternative solutions-dumb sensors and decentralized architectures or smart sensors and centralized architectures-have the worst of both worlds: they would either miss the problems or involve enormous investment. Neither is viable.)
In short, correlation at the scale and speed at which a system serving two million users is expected to operate is not achievable using common production technology. * Device management: The devices will require periodic updates.
Protecting IDS/IPS control mechanisms and pathways against intrusion, disruption, modification, and monitoring will be very challenging.
* Signature management: Signatures are likely to be a mix of classified signatures developed by the government and unclassified signatures from commercial IDS and IPS vendors. These will have to be protected from those operating the IDS/IPS systems as well as from Internet-based attackers.
* Data security: Network communications are increasingly encrypted through company VPNs, etc.; in some cases federal regulations require the use of encryption (e.g., in sharing medical records). In order for the IDS/IPS systems to prevent malware from reaching end users, communications transiting the IDS/IPS must be decrypted. Thus the IDS/IPS systems become a particularly ripe place for attack.
The above are issues for any IDS/IPS system centralizing monitoring and protection function through few pipes. Now consider EINSTEIN, which proposes to do the same, but at a large jump in the scale of the network being scrutinized. The Trusted Internet Connections initiative, which supports EINSTEIN, will ensure that all communications between federal civilian agencies and the Internetboth those generated by people and those by services-occur via managed connections. Since some government agencies exchange very large quantities of research data with their partners in the private sector-data sets on the order of terabytes-some connections involve quite high bandwidth. The public EINSTEIN documents provide limited details on how the technology will function, therefore thought experiments are needed-not inappropriate for a technology named EINSTEIN.
Scaling is a problem: Although the actual performance of the EINSTEIN 3 device is not public, the cost impact of requiring a significant amount of real-time monitoring of Internet streams can be illustrated by examining a "typical" case based on the speed of products publicly available. We begin by noting that in a fully realized TIC program to minimize the number of interconnect points, the number will be more than one hundred and may be in the low hundreds.
Consider a single shelf Cisco CRS-1 router of the type used both in Internet backbones and to aggregate traffic from local networks before sending it to the Internet. According to Cisco's press releases, more than 5,000 of these routers have been sold and deployed. When fully loaded, the CRS-i will accept 64 10 Gb/s duplex communications links, operating at a total bit rate of 1.28 terabits/second.
3 5 While some routing nodes are smaller, some are much larger, so using a number of CRS-is connected together handles the required load. While neither the exact nature of the algorithms planned for EINSTEIN 3 nor the equipment configuration planned for it have been disclosed, it is reasonable to assume a model in which the computation required for performing the IDS/IPS function at a federal civilian agency will be similar to that in commercial network defense products built and sold by Narus, Cloudshield, and others. It seems highly unlikely that a single EINSTEIN 3 device can run sufficiently fast so as to monitor the high-speed connections between some of the federal civilian agencies and the Internet or private sector agency partners. There are obviously differences in the details of the various industry products, but a review of their specifications reveals that a unit capable of examining, in real time, 20 Gb/s of Internet traffic costs about $80K and consumes about 2 kW (and another 2 kW for cooling). Because each CRS-I will accept 64 10 Gb/s duplex communications links, a single half-rack CRS-I would therefore require 64 such network defense units, at a cost of roughly $5M, roughly 250 kW of power consumption, and roughly 32 equipment racks. This has two important implications: (1) because packet content, and not just packet headers, will need to be examined, each router used for directing traffic will require 64 times as much equipment to perform EINSTEIN-type security clearly a losing battle-and; (2) the EINSTEIN program, at least the instantiation of EINSTEIN 3, would be roughly one billion dollars solely for equipment costs.
Device management: Installed in TICAPs, many of the EINSTEIN devices will be in non-government facilities, but will need to be remotely controlled by US-CERT. Ensuring that the control mechanisms and pathways are protected against intrusion, disruption, modification, and monitoring will be challenging. Ensuring that such control paths are isolated from the Internet is likely to be a minimum requirement, but history has shown that isolated systems sometimes do not stay isolated. 36 And, as the Stuxnet case so vividly demonstrates, even seemingly isolated systems can be vulnerable to attacks. 3 7 EINSTEIN 3 devices are not designed to work autonomously. They are designed to be managed by, and report to, one or more control systems. A number of large Internet service providers (ISPs) and large enterprise networks have developed procedures and control systems to provide secure management of multiple network devices, such as routers or firewalls. Due to the dual requirements of being able to quickly determine an attack is underway, and to react to that attack by reconfiguring other EINSTEIN devices, the management requirements for EINSTEIN devices are likely to be far more dynamic than what is required for current ISP or enterprise network devices. Developing the tools needed to manage the EINSTEIN 3 devices may turn out to be a significant technical challenge. * The feasibility of correlation: As we have already noted, correlation, particularly at the scale and speed at which EINSTEIN 3 is expected to operate, is simply not achievable using common production technology.
* Complexity of combining classified and non-classified signatures: Both classified and unclassified signatures will be used for intrusion detection.S As already noted, some signatures that EINSTEIN 3 will use will be developed by the government and will be classified while others are likely to come from commercial IDS and IPS vendors. The protection of classified signatures and the protection of any captured network traffic will be a challenge for the EINSTEIN devices located in the TICAPs, particularly for the commercial providers. The signatures will have to be protected from the TICAP operator and from Internet-based attackers. The latter is particularly important since knowing what the EINSTEIN device is looking for would simplify an attacker's approach.
These technical complexities make it highly unlikely that EINSTEIN 3 can accomplish the purposes for which it is being designed. The use of EINSTEIN 3 also raises various policy issues.
The first arises from the fact that Internet traffic is increasingly encrypted. 39 Indeed, many government websites offer encrypted services (e.g., the IRS). It is to be expected that government employees will be accessing non-government encrypted services on a regular basis (e.g., banking sites), but the current set of public EINSTEIN 3 documents do not discuss how EINSTEIN 3 will handle encrypted traffic. One option would be for the EINSTEIN devices to ignore the contents of encrypted traffic, but that would provide an unmonitored attack pathway. Devices such as EINSTEIN 3 that are in the communications path can be designed to mimic cooperating websites (by using those websites' identities and credentials) to both expose the encrypted traffic to EINSTEIN 3 and permit that traffic to be stored. These policies should be openly developed to ensure that the public understands the implications of the EINSTEIN 3 system.
A second critical issue is that any IDS looking for long-term subtle attacks must store large amounts of traffic for non real-time analysis. This data could also be useful in tracking down wrongdoing by government employees or people with whom they communicate. Even if current EINSTSEIN 3 software is not designed for such analysis, the system is likely to store data that government agencies might like to use-creating danger of misuse. Thus it is imperative that a detailed log is generated for all functions that the EINSTEIN 3 device has been configured to perform.
Policies will have to be developed to detail legitimate uses of the EINSTEIN 3 devices. The only way to ensure, however, that such policies are followed is to produce detailed logs that cannot be altered. Logs must be out of the reach of individuals who might misuse the EINSTEIN 3 devices, and these must be regularly and automatically scanned to reveal unexpected activities. Given the technology's potential for tracking individuals, policies should be developed to enable access to the logs if questions arise regarding how the EINSTEIN 3 devices are being used. There should be regular scrutiny of these logs by agency Inspectors General.
Extending EINSTEIN 3 to non-government critical infrastructure would require similar policy development, an issue to which we now turn.
IV. Expanding EINSTEIN Capabilities to Critical Infrastructure
Certain critical infrastructures such as telecommunications and the electric power grid are essential not only to the running of society, but also to the functioning of the U.S. government, and thus the federal government has a direct vested interest in the security of the computer networks supporting these infrastructures. But direct vested interest does not mean that the federal government can force its solution onto the private sector. The fact that private industry controls 85% of critical infrastructure 4 0 means that the situation is not straightforward. In fact, it is far from straightforward.
The real question is what problem is EINSTEIN attempting to solve. One possible purpose is to simply provide NSA-supplied signatures to IDSs and IPSs protecting critical infrastructure. Another is to correlate anomalous behavior on incoming traffic. A third possibility is to detect all anomalous traffic. We believe that the first, using NSA-supplied signatures to protect public communications, raises technical complexities, but can be accomplished. We believe the remaining two, applied to privately-owned critical infrastructure, are not reasonable expectations. Let us consider the issues. We begin by discussing the general issues involved in performing real-time intrusion detection and intrusion prevention on a nation-wide scale. We then consider two critical infrastructures-telecommunications and the power grid-in some detail. In this discussion, we are assuming the approach to be the full EINSTEIN architecture, that is: TICAPs with crosssite correlation and an automatic reaction to anomalous events. Our critiques follow from there.
A. The Complexities of Information Collection
The EINSTEIN architecture forces a limited number of federal civilian agency access points to the Internet. In the federal sector this reachability to a limited number of access points was not particularly difficult to achieve or enforce. However, as much as various federal agencies might clash with one another for responsibilities and resources, ultimately these agencies serve the same customer. Even if agencies A and B compete in some spheres, it is perfectly reasonable to expect they would cooperate in enabling real-time correlation of transactional information to find that U.S. government sites are under attack.
To provide EINSTEIN-type protection in the private sector would require coalescing connections to the public Internet. It is far more difficult to imagine a collaboration model here. Many suppliers of critical infrastructure are genuine competitors. The manager of an EINSTEIN device has control over the communications that run through the device. Who would run the EINSTEIN devices for competing companies? Putting company A in the control seat of connections to the public Internet makes it very powerful. Would its competitor B willingly use the services of a TICAP hosted at A? Even though B should encrypt its communications end-to-end, there are any number of nefarious activities that A might employ to impede its competitors, including using the IDS/IPS to throttle the communications of company B. Even short communications delays can have massive impacts for companies. 4 ' Would B have to pay A for its services?
A related issue is device management. Because EINSTEIN 3 devices store classified signatures, control of the private-sector systems should be handled under the aegis of the federal government (and specifically by the agency supplying the signatures). Such a solution presents myriad complexities, and the history of real-time data sharing between the private and public sector has not been a positive one.
In 1998, Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) made protection of critical infrastructure a national objective. Since then publicprivate partnerships have been recommended, been created, and failed, only to be re-recommended, be re-created, and fail again. The 1998 PDD-63 created Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), 42 but was superseded in 2003 by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, which made DHS responsible for coordinating plans for protecting critical infrastructure. This included developing plans for coordinating publicprivate partnerships. In 2006, DHS issued a National Infrastructure Protection Plan with public/private partnerships with two councils for each sector-a government one and a private sector one-to handle planning and coordination. The issue of public-private partnerships arose again in 2009 with the 60-day Cbersecurity Review 4 3 conducted at the behest of President Obama.
In 2010, the Government Accountability Office reviewed publicprivate partnerships, and concluded that federal partners are not consistently meeting private sector expectations, including providing timely and actionable cyber threat information and alerts, according to private sector stakeholders."4 Problems included a lack of timely information, a lack of access to secure settings in which to exchange private information, and a lack of "one-stop" shopping-one federal office from which to find out information.45 This does not bode well for private-sector use of EINSTEINtype systems.
42 For example, the IT-ISAC was created by the IT industry for systematic sharing and exchange of information on "electronic incidents, threats, attacks, vulnerabilities, solutions and countermeasures, best security practices and other protective measures" and includes such industry leaders as CA, Computer Sciences Corporation., IBM, IntelJuniper Networks, Microsoft., Oracle., Symatec, and Verisign. See About the IT ISAC, https://www.it-isac.org/about-n.php (last visited Oct. 16, 2011). One example of the types of issues that would arise is signature collection. How would signatures amassed by private parties, e.g., the critical infrastructures themselves-or the companies with which they contract-be added to the EINSTEIN devices? Concerns run from mundane issues of whether signature formats will be public to knotty management concerns. Because private parties would not control the EINSTEIN devices, presumably they would not be able to directly add signatures to the IDS and IPS. This would have the counterproductive effect of removing private companies from the process of protecting their own customers. Such lack of direct control will create various problems, and would, at a minimum, create delay in adding signatures found by the private companies onto the EINSTEIN devices. The distributed control between government and the private sector also raises legal concerns. Who bears fiscal responsibility for attacks that occur from problems that were known-ones that the private entities had uncovered but that had not yet been added to the system? Distributed control leaves gaps, including the issue of who would bear responsibility for attacks that neither the U.S. federal government nor the private entities had yet uncovered. In mandating an EINSTEIN-like system be used on a private network, would the federal government indemnify the owners if cyberattacks occurred?
CYBLRSPACE POLICY RE\IEW
Privacy would become a much greater concern were EINSTEIN technology to be extended from federal systems to the private sector. EINSTEIN 2 collects and retains transactional information in order to check for anomalous patterns. The collection includes packet length, protocol, source, and destination IP address and port numbersinformation already shared with Internet routers. In Smith v. Maryland, 4 7 the Supreme Court ruled that information such as dialed numbers shared with third parties do not require government investigators to obtain a warrant. Thus extending EINSTEIN 2-type technology to the private sector might not invoke Fourth Amendment protections. 48
EINSTEIN 3 is another matter. This technology would scan and
analyze not just metadata, but also content. Information would be stored on suspicion of being malware, not on the knowledge that it is so. Harvard Law School Professor Jack Goldsmith has argued that using EINSTEIN-type technologies to monitor communications for malware is akin to conducting "non-law-enforcement searches without individualized suspicion in numerous contexts," and cited highway checkpoints and inspections of regulated businesses as precedent for such monitoring sans warrants. 49 Communications form a special class however. Wiretap warrants require a higher standard of proof than standard search warrants. Goldsmith proposes handling potential invasiveness of an EINSTEIN-type system with "significant use restrictions" on the communications stored through EINSTEIN, limiting the set of crimes for which a sender could be prosecuted to computer-related and national-security offenses.ao This proposal sounds somewhat better in theory than it is likely to be in practice. 
50Id. at 15-16.
Wiretap law is replete with instances where an initially restrictive collection is substantially expanded over time.
Consider, for example, the 1967 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.? Title III of the act delineated the requirements for obtaining a wiretap warrant. Because of a history of law-enforcement abuse of wiretaps, 2 Congress sharply limited the circumstances under which lawenforcement investigators could obtain a wiretap for a criminal investigation. The law listed twenty-five serious crimes for which a wiretap order could be obtained, and these were the only crimes for which a wiretap order for a criminal investigation could be issued. With time, that list was amended, and the number of crimes for which a wiretap warrant can be obtained now stands at slightly under one hundred. 3 A similar situation occurred for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which puts forth the requirements for a foreign-intelligence wiretap order. While some expansions were due to changes in technology (e.g., the shift to fiber optic cable that partially precipitated the FISA Amendments Act), other expansions of the law, most notably lowering the need for foreign intelligence from being "the purpose" of the order to simply being a "significant purpose">' have substantively changed the original law. Goldsmith's proposed limitation may not actually work very well in practice. An IDS/IPS mechanism that scanned private-sector communications networks for malware, but which used the gathered information for criminal investigations, is highly problematic from a Fourth Amendment point of view and would be unlikely to gain public support-at least if the technology's import is made clear.
Data retention raises concerns on another dimension. Given that competing firms run critical infrastructure, how would information be shared? Privacy and competition issues severely complicate such data sharing. There may be legal restrictions on disclosing personally identifiable information. New policy provisions and new laws would be needed in order to handle the information sharing that an EINSTEIN system would require in the broad private-sector environment (as opposed to the federal civilian agency sector).
We note that as a result of the liberalization of U.S. cryptography export regulations in 2000,55 encrypted communication has become much more common. The peer-to-peer VoIP system Skype uses end-to-end encryption,5 6 which ensures only the sender and recipient may understand the conversation. Many large enterprises employ virtual private networks (VPNs), where communications are encrypted on a server within the corporate network then travel the public communications network and are decrypted once the communication is again within the corporate network. Indeed, while private carriers transport the confidential communications of the U.S. government, these are often encrypted end-to-end. (If federal government communications are to be secured-say if such communications from a San Francisco switching office were sent to a federal agency on the East Coast-then the communications architecture would likely enter the leased fiber-borne "TI line" to the destination. Communications would first be encrypted according to NSA-approved or NIST-approved methods, 7 then enter the TI link. Fully protected against being read, the communication would travel the "public highway" to the East Coast, where it would be decrypted after it reaches its endpoint. This method of communications security would have advantages and disadvantages. While the architecture secures the communication during its transit, it does not ensure reliability and the arrival of the communication? . 1, 2011) . 5 The system used would depend on whether the communication was classified. 8 Consider, for example, the events ofJuly 2001. Several cars on a 60-car CSX train going through the Howard Street Tunnel in Baltimore derailed, and a fire broke out. The hightemperature fire took five days to put out. During that time large amounts of road traffic in Baltimore were disrupted. Other disruptions occurred, notably the disruption of communications traffic along the East Coast. Seven of the largest U.S. ISPs used a fiber optic cable that ran through the Howard Street Tunnel and the fire burnt through the pipe housing the cable. MARK CARTER LT AL., U.S. DLP'T O1 TkANS., EFFECTS OF
CATASTROPHIC E\ENTS ON TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS

(2003).
The moral: unless the U.S. government owns the entire physical infrastructure of the communications network, U.S. government communications will always be subject to the "backhoe problem." That said, the communications security described above is sufficient for federal civilian agencies for all practical purposes.
EINSTEIN-type devices operating on encrypted communications would not be able to examine the content of the communications.
EINSTEIN devices would be able to examine transactional information, but only if the communications were not traveling through a VPN or encrypted in which case, the only information revealed during interception would be that the communications' destination is within the corporate network.5 9 Information about the ultimate endpoints of the communication would become available once the traffic was within the corporate network.
Because enterprise communications would likely be using VPNs, if EINSTEIN-type surveillance were to become de rigeur for telecommunications, we might find ourselves in the odd situation in which corporate communications were routinely afforded privacy from surveillance while private communications of private citizens were not. One can imagine "solutions" to this: solutions likely to complicate lawenforcement wiretapping.
It is by now clear that an extension of EINSTEIN-type technology to the private sector would be remarkably complicated both from a policy and technical viewpoint. The most basic issue, however, is how to process the massive amounts of data that may traverse an EINSTEIN-type system. As is usually the case in such situations, complexity lies in the details. We turn to the potential role of EINSTEIN-type technology in two specific examples of critical infrastructure.
B. The Complexities Posed by Telecommunications
By interposing an eavesdropper on all communications traveling over the network, an EINSTEIN-type system on a public communications network would be disruptive because of both technical issues and policy concerns. We start with the technical issues. * This is true even if a VPN user were sending a mail to someone outside the corporation. The communication would travel from the user to the corporate VPN server, where it would be decrypted and then sent to the mail server. At that point, it would travel as mail. From the point of view of an interceptor, the communication's destination is the corporate mail server.
Whether an EINSTEIN-type system can work in the public communications sector is completely based on the numbers: how many packets flow through an EINSTEIN device per second, how long it takes to examine these, and how many can be stored for later examination. In the 1990s the rate of communications transmission was sufficiently slow that the communications bits could be effectively examined and stored-at least if one did sampling. Fiber optics changed the equation; the technology of fiber optic transmission and packet routing has outstripped that of computation for the past twenty years, and that trend is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Computation-based monitoring of a significant portion of the Internet is likely to be very costly and impractical in all but very special cases.
The cost of storage is now dropping even faster than the rate of transmission is increasing, and instead there might be a temptation to store all questionable communication to be examined later. Recall the Cisco router described in Section III. What if, instead of examining all inputs to the CRS-i in real time, we recorded the traffic for later examination if a threat signature were detected elsewhere. The combined input and output rate of a fully loaded single-shelf CRS-1 is 1.28 Tb/sec, which translates to 160 GBytes/sec. Thus, to store all the comings and goings for a single highend router for a day would require storage equal to about 14 petaBytes/day. Clearly the long-term storage of a router's traffic flow for later consideration is not practical. The numbers preclude EINSTEIN technology from sharing all the packets that pass through, though sharing abstracts, summaries, or snippets might work (depending on size and form of comparison being done).
Sharing transactional information would be one way to share attack information without requiring the enormous bandwidth calculated above. Despite current limited legal protections given to transactional information, communication transactional information is itself a rich source of private information. Golle and Partridge have observed, for example, that if one can determine the home and work location of a user (easily done, for example, from determining the cell location of communications made between the hours of 11 pm and 7 am and between 9 am and 5 pm respectively), then re-identification of a previously "anonymous" user may be achieved. 60 Long-term storage of transactional data for later study creates a new security risk, while centralizing the data would create an even bigger one. The latter argues for providing privacy protections to the data. How well will this work in practice? Such techniques may destroy much of the value of the data for the IDS/IPS.
The final-and perhaps most important-issue arises from the role of telecommunications in society. It is appropriate for an IDS and IPS to act conservatively, and thus to prohibit those types of communications that are not explicitly allowed. So an IPS should naturally disallow a new form of communications technology, whether Instant Messaging, Skype, Twitter, Facebook, or some new application, until it is determined by the IDS/IPS designers that the new communications forms are not malware. Although there may be costs to the public if the Veterans Administration or the Department of Health and Human Services does not immediately implement the newest communications technologies such as Facebook or Twitter, such a conservative design makes sense for a federal system IDS/IPS. This approach does not make sense for an EINSTEIN-type system protecting public telecommunications. Unless the EINSTEIN technology only uses blacklisting ("prohibit communications with these signatures"), EINSTEIN-type technologies at telecommunications carriers will prevent early deployment and testing of innovative communications technologies. That would be an enormous mistake.
The model of few TICs cannot apply to telecommunications infrastructure. Underlying EINSTEIN's inapplicability is the fact that communications infrastructure has few commonalities with the U.S. federal government. Telecommunications has many, many pipes and many of those are big (10 gigabits/second and greater). 6 1 The U.S. has about 6500 telecommunications carrierS 62 and over ten thousand Internet Service Providers, 63 which means that there are many, many more communications providers than departments of the federal government. Absent U.S. federal government requirements-which would be very hard to achievetelecommunications players have no incentive to cooperate; indeed, because they are commercial competitors, they have a strong disincentive to do so. Meanwhile, EINSTEIN itself creates risks. Concentrating traffic anywhere-central to the EINSTEIN 3 concept of discovery creates its own vulnerabilities. 64 Various commonly used technologies for information protection, such as VPNs, will thwart the EINSTEIN model for detecting "bad" behavior. And finally, aside from the federal employees communicating using government computers, the customer-the publichas Fourth Amendment and statutory rights that are greatly threatened by this technology.
C. The Complexities Posed by the Power Grid
On a first glance, it seems that the EINSTEIN technology would be an extremely good match for the power grid. The grid is heavily reliant upon computer networks, both at the consumer level, where such networks are used to bill customers, and at the grid management level, where computer networks coordinate power generation and transmission. The industry is moving towards "smart grid," a two-way digital communication and control system in which the utilities will send messages to devices in the home and office about energy prices in real time (e.g., on a hot summer day when the temperature is causing high demand for air conditioning), and users' systems will respond accordingly (e.g., by shutting down until prices are lower).
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We already have ample demonstration of security problems. In 2007 researchers at the Idaho National Laboratory showed how to access a power plant's control system through the Internet. Running an emulator, the researchers destroyed a 27-ton power generator by power cycling at very short intervals. 66 In 2009 there were news reports that the power grid had been penetrated by spies who might have left rogue code behind. 67 In 2010 the Stuxnet worm targeted Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems used to monitor and control industrial processes specifically those controlling Iranian nuclear centrifugeS 68 -amply demonstrating proof of concept. 69 Increasing amounts of electronic communications from the smart grid means there will be need to directly protect customers (e.g., from attackers who snoop on the communication with smart meters or, worse yet, send forged messages about electricity usage). Meanwhile the fact that the power industry is heavily regulated should help with lowering barriers to sharing cyberattack data among the energy providers. It would seem the cyber networks of the power grid would be ripe for EINSTEIN.
On closer examination, the fit is less clear. The power grid cyber network is actually four networks with different users, different levels of protection, and different protection needs. We begin by enumerating these networks: * Providing customers with data about electricity usage: Consumers often have web access to account information, such as their latest bill and summaries of electricity usage. This communication takes place over the Internet and relies on the customer's own Internet connection.
* Providing utilities with information about electricity usage: Utilities increasingly rely on computer networks to remotely read customer electricity meters. Many utilities build and deploy their own networks over many kinds of low-bandwidth "last mile" technologies; these include microwave, power line, radio, cellular, and wireless mesh networks. User privacy is important to avoid revealing sensitive information, such as whether and when customers are at home. 70 * Controlling the customers' smart devices: With the move toward a smart grid, utilities will increasingly communicate directly with devices such as refrigerators, dish washers, or air conditioners at the customer sites, in order to adapt electricity usage to current demands. The technologies for smart devices are still in an early stage. Rather than the utilities supporting a diverse array of communication media, devices are likely to rely on customers' Internet connections for communication with the utilities.
* Managing the power grid: Communication networks play an important role in managing power generation and distribution, including coordination between various electricity providers, operations, economic markets, and transmission systems. While this communication could take place over private networks, in practice many companies rely on the public Internet in one form or another. Some utility companies may also rely on the "cloud"-servers hosted in data centers-to run their management systems and share data with third parties.
The first and third cases-customers and devices communicating with the utilities over the Internet-is a telecommunications issue, and one we have already discussed with respect to EINSTEIN's applicability. We focus instead on the networks for reading and controlling customer usage and for managing the grid. Deploying EINSTEIN 3 would face many difficult challenges. The first of these is complexity.
There are a large (and growing) number of energy providers communicating in complex ways over a mix of public and private networks. According to Lockheed Martin, by 2015 the smart grid will offer up to 440 million potential points of attack. 7 ' Not only is power highly distributed to millions of customers, but also power generation is increasingly distributed, with a large number of small providers, including individual households, contributing energy to the grid. These "last mile" networks are an important part of the cyber security problem facing the power grid, but they are hard to protect without a large-scale deployment of security infrastructure.
At the same time, the grid involves many independent (sometimes competing) parties with complex trust relationships. The grid is, at best, a loosely coupled federation, 7 2 making it difficult to consolidate into a small number of network attachment points as the U.S. federal government is achieving through TIC. Even if consolidation were possible, the requirements for real-time data and high reliability make it undesirable to circuitously direct data through few consolidated access points. Yet any practical deployment of EINSTEIN 3 would have to occur at locations where these small, heterogeneous networks aggregate. For example, a provider could place an EINSTEIN 3 device at a site that aggregates the connectivity to all of its customers, or at "peering" locations that connect the provider to other parts of the grid. As such, any deployment of EINSTEIN 3 in the power grid would likely involve a large number of locations, which may be logistically and financially unwieldy and make any ability to do correlation of anomalous behavior much less likely.
The second major problem is function mismatch. The IDS/IPS solutions useful for protecting U.S. federal government computer networks may not be a fit for the power grid and may in fact have to be completely redesigned for use in the power grid. Just as in the telecommunications sector, many parties in the energy grid already have their own IDS/IPS and firewall solutions from a variety of vendors, making the EINSTEIN 3 equipment at least partially redundant. A more complex issue is reporting. compression, SCADA-specific reporting, and integration with existing management tools that are not naturally part of EINSTEIN 3-type devices.
SCADA presents a particular problem. SCADA systems are typically not used in Internet applications, and thus parsing the messages sent and received by these protocols would require custom extensions to EINSTEIN 3. Perhaps more importantly, these systems have vulnerabilities subject to unique attacks, such as the Stuxnet worm that attacked Siemens SCADA systems in several countries in the summer of 2010. The EINSTEIN 3 system in the power grid would need to create and continually extend a library of signatures for these SCADA systems, increasing the cost and effort in running the EINSTEIN 3 program. These requirements mean that EINSTEIN 3 equipment cannot be extended to subsume all of this functionality without a major redesign-at great expense and uncertain outcome. Future trends further complicate the problem.
Certain grid communications, particularly in the back-end systems that control electricity generation and distribution, are highly sensitive to delay, which forcing traffic through a small number of EINSTEIN 3 locations would only increase. At this time, the grid does not have hard requirements on communication delay, but this could easily change with a move toward finer-grain control of electricity generation and distribution.
Meanwhile fundamental to any security solution for power grid communication is encryption. 7 5 Systems like EINSTEIN 3 can, at best, detect attacks while they are happening. Encryption of the critical communication in the grid can help prevent many of these attacks in the first place. Supporting encryption is challenging, as it requires support from the many customer meters and smart devices, as well as having secure ways to exchange keys between customers and the utilities. We discuss encryption in the next section, but note that whatever encryption solutions are chosen will have a significant influence on whether and how systems like EINSTEIN 3 should be deployed. This strongly implies that the basic security architecture for the grid should be resolved before significant effort is made to deploy EINSTEIN 3 within the power grid.
7 Currently encryption is not required. When it is implemented, the implementation is often very poorly done. SeeJoshua Pennell, Securing the Sniart Grid: 7he Road Ahead, NETWORK SLCURITYEDGL (Feb. 5, 2010) , http://www.networksecurityedge.com/content/securing-smart-grid-road-ahead?page=2.
It is now time to turn to security solutions.
D. Approaches to Securing the Cyber Networks of Telecommunications and the Power Grid
We have argued that EINSTEIN 3 protections are inappropriate and infeasible for the commercial telecommunications infrastructure and the power grid. What might be done as a practical alternative?
Beginning with telecommunications infrastructure, it is instructive to consider how such infrastructure was protected when AT&T was essentially the sole provider of telecommunications services in the United States. At the time the company owned and operated the vast majority of the country's long-haul transmission systems (AT&T Long Lines). It operated two basic types of services over these: retail switched long-distance service, and the long-term lease of "private lines" to both private companies (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange) and governmental organizations (e.g., the U.S. Department of Defense).
The combination of legal requirements and good engineering practice led the design of a network that was secured from a large variety of threats by three basic methods: * Physical security: The carriage of U.S. government traffic on the AT&T network led to the requirement of physically securing and monitoring all AT&T transmission and switching facilities. * Transmission security: At least to a reasonable degree, the signals carried over AT&T's transmission facilities were protected from intercept. While only a few signals were encrypted, all were carried by means physically or technologically resistant to interception (e.g., on buried coaxial cable, or on multiplexed microwave signals).
* Separation of control and content: For a variety of reasons, AT&T embarked in the middle 1970s on an aggressive effort to separate the control information used to set up phone calls, and control the network in general, from the circuits used to actually carry the call.76 This approach, termed "out-of-band signaling," and today referred to as Signaling System #7, is now the rule in telephone systems (but not in data networks like the Internet). With the "signaling" separated from the content it was possible to make the network more robust in many ways, to improve its operating efficiency, to introduce new services such as 800 calls, and, of importance here, to dramatically reduce an adversary's ability to intercept calls or to manipulate the telephone network itself.
There are two obvious differences between the modern telecommunications infrastructure in the present compared to that of the U.S. of thirty years ago: (1) AT&T is not the only long-distance provider any more; and (2) much more data is being transmitted than voice. A more nuanced comparison reveals the following differences, leading to the conclusion that the telecommunications infrastructure had more security than it does in the present day: * Physical security: For a variety of reasons, but mostly owing to the financial cost involved, the plethora of modern North American telecommunications providers, many of them small and undercapitalized, provide little practical physical security for their transmission and routing equipment. * Transmission security: Even though the wholesale conversion to digital transmission from the old analog methods would appear to equally permit wholesale use of encryption-based transmission security, it is still rarely used. * Separation of the control and content "planes": Originally because of different architectural design principles and future research plans in the ARPANET, and now locked into decades of legacy practice, the Internet operates on the principle of passing both the control and content information for an application over the same "pipe." It is much harder to tamper with traffic or traffic routing, or to eavesdrop on content if control and content message are in different communications channels (the Signaling System #7 solution) than if the control and content are in the same communications channel. The practice of combining control and content permits a wide variety of attacks on both the users of the network and the network itself.
In an interesting case of "back to the future," rather than proposing EINSTEIN 3 protections for telecommunications infrastructure, perhaps we should consider reintroducing telecommunications design principles that were in place three decades ago and applying these principles to cyber networks. While requiring these of all network operators might be neither desirable nor practical, it would not be unreasonable to consider that only "certified" network operators be considered when procuring communication services supporting critical civil or military activities. This certification should include, in order: (1) physical security; (2) transmission security via encryption or arguably equivalent protection; and (3) the use of techniques that isolate the control of the network itself from the content it carries. Such a separation would secure that which needed securing without the disruption provided by an IDS/IPS that would prevent the innovative telecommunications services the dynamic information and communications technologies sector keeps providing.
The cyber infrastructures of the power grid, although vulnerable to cyberattacks, present a very different case. While critical infrastructure could (and perhaps should) not be accessible via the Internet, the system should be able to prevent malicious behavior-whether the attack is launched remotely or not. The controlling computer, aware of the generator's limitations, should refuse to initiate commands that would damage the equipment. Still, this solution merely introduces another problem-ensuring the controller software itself is reliable. But in this problem lies the key to protecting power grid infrastructure.
Unlike telecommunications, the cyber networks of the power grid do not provide, or need to use, hot-from-the-developers communication technologies. This, and the fact that changes in power grid technology happen slowly-at least when measured by Internet years-greatly simplify the problem of protecting the cyber infrastructure of the power grid. Compared to operations that control the generator, software changes in power grid cyber infrastructure occur relatively infrequently. Software updates could be delivered via a trusted courier instead of over the network.
The broader solution to many of the security problems facing the power grid is cryptographic. No instruction to change behavior and or replace software should be accepted unless it is digitally signed. Once appropriate cryptographic measures are in place, the physical origins of the commands are no longer a concern; these commands can come in person, by telephone, the Internet, or satellite radio. The essential mechanism is guaranteeing that the agent with the authority to give a command possesses the correct authorizing key and is the only possessor of that key. The scale and diversity of authority can raise challenges in distributing and managing keys. Fortunately, the power grid consists of just a few thousand power companies in the United States, and not all of these companies run generators. This is not a particularly large number of users for a keymanagement system.
Cryptography also offers a way of controlling smart devices and providing data about electricity usage. For example, encrypting communication from the electricity meter to the power company prevents rogue parties from passively snooping on the transmissions. Authenticating the messages from the power company to smart devices prevents unauthorized parties from remotely controlling these devices. Ensuring that electricity meters and smart devices have keys and the necessary cryptographic machinery is no trivial matter. Yet grappling with these issues is crucial to ensuring the security of the power grid, whether or not a system like EINSTEIN 3 is ever deployed.
V. Making Sense of Virtual Fences
In 2005 Governor of Arizona Janet Napolitano said, "You show me a 50-foot wall and I'll show you a 51-foot ladder." 7 7 She was discussing the physical fence being built between Mexico and the United States. Over time, the wall became a virtual one, in which electronic sensors, radar, and cameras were used to alert border guards about illegal crossings. In 2011, as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Napolitano canceled the project, 78 which had cost one billion dollars over its five-year effort. The secretary concluded the project was not viable. It would have been better, of course, to have realized this earlier. 79 Had the "virtual fence" been evaluated for effectiveness from the start, it might never have gotten off the ground. The savings in time would have been quite valuable; even more important were the lost opportunities to pursue alternative solutions, opportunities lost because of diverted resources. Effectiveness matters, and should be measured at all points along the development cycle of a project.
EINSTEIN 3 is an electronic fence. The arguments in Section IV do not mean EINSTEIN-type solutions have no value. Rather, they mean that the effectiveness of such solutions should be weighed against alternatives before they are developed, and development should proceed with the technologies most likely to provide the needed security.
There are a number of problems to be solved in order for EINSTEIN-type solutions to succeed. For example, within telecommunications, the issue of de-identified data sharing is one worth exploring. Recent research on "privacy-preserving" algorithms identifies ways to compute answers to data-analysis questions without revealing the raw input data. The classic example is the "millionaire problem," where two people want to know who is richer without revealing the precise amount of their wealth to each other. 8 0 In the context of IDS/IPS systems, multiple sites, each run by different companies, may want to identify malicious users that send excessive traffic, while neither divulging the total traffic received at each site nor revealing the access patterns of the well-behaved users. 8 1 Promising solutions already exist for many of these kinds of data-analysis tasks. Further innovations in this area could lower the barrier for collaborative security solutions to protect critical infrastructure.
Another direction to pursue is opening up the EINSTEIN architecture to public view. While using classified signatures on a privatesector IDS/IPS creates a complicated control mechanism, the decision to have some signatures classified may not itself be unreasonable. That is in contrast to the decision to classify the architecture, which is not a sensible choice. A fundamental principle in cryptography, Kerchoffs' Law, is that a cryptosystem's security should depend not on the secrecy of the algorithm but solely on the secrecy of the key. 82 Similarly, an IDS/IPS security solution should depend solely on the secrecy of the signatures being used.
Public examination of the architecture allows a full appraisal and will establish greater confidence and trust in the system. The lack of a public vetting of the EINSTEIN 3 architecture being used in protecting federal civilian agencies means that there has been virtually no informed public discussion on the efficacy of using EINSTEIN-type technologies in protecting critical infrastructure. Consider the virtual fence at the border, the project that Secretary Napolitano canceled. "The problem with the [virtual fence] was that it is the wrong kind of technology to be deployed across the entire U.S.-Mexico border," Napolitano said. "It was too expensive, it was too elaborate and it was not flexible enough to meet the fact that immigration patterns change." 8 3 In the absence of a public vetting of EINSTEIN 3 technology, it too is likely to be too expensive, too elaborate and not sufficiently flexible as attacks vectors change. In order to consider such a heavyweight security solution, the architecture should be made public. This should happen early in the life of the program.
The publicly available documentation on EINSTEIN does little to clarify the technology's limitations. While experts understand that signaturebased schemes can only protect against known attacks, the publicly available documentation on the EINSTEIN technology does not state this. U.S. After examining the complications of applying EINSTEIN 3-type solutions to telecommunications and the power grid, it should be clear that the current architecture of EINSTEIN 3-concentrated Internet access points cooperating to perform intrusion detection/prevention-does not provide a viable model for protecting the cyber networks of critical infrastructure. EINSTEIN 3 is a virtual fence that has the potential to work when you can funnel all comers through your gates-that is EINSTEIN 3 applied to the federal civilian agency sector but not when architecture and control are highly distributed. Private infrastructure is likely to remain inherently more distributed and less trusting of partners than U.S. federal government services. To be viable, what is needed for protecting critical infrastructure's cyber networks are new IDS/IPS solutions that scale to a large number of vantage points and analyze traffic without divulging private user data or proprietary business data. That should be the direction pursued in protecting these networks, not that of molding them into centralized systems more akin to the public switched telephone network. Sometimes hammers are just not appropriate solutions. So it is in this case.
" We say "essentially," since by eliminating some malware, the exploitations launched by the highly targeted attacks may stand out more. That is, however, a second-order effect, and one that cannot be counted upon. " EINSTEIN should be able to prevent phishing and spear phishing attacks that use known malware. Highly-targeted spear phishing exploitations using zero-day attacks are unlikely to be stopped. 8 INITIATIVL THRLL EXLRCISL, supra note 24.
